

# 1                   **Unsustainabilities – A new area of research** 2                   **for transition studies**

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4                   **Jochen Markard, Peter Wells, Xiao-Shan Yap, Harro van Lente**

## 5    1   Introduction

6    Research and practice in the field of sustainability transitions has the ambition to  
7    address pressing sustainability challenges such as climate change, waste or  
8    resource depletion, through fundamental transformations of socio-technical  
9    systems around energy, transport, agri-food or water (EEA, 2019; Köhler et al.,  
10   2019; Victor et al., 2019). So far, this agenda has been pursued with two major  
11   strategies: supporting innovations that provide more sustainable alternatives to  
12   existing practices and guiding system transformation, including the decline of  
13   unsustainable practices and technologies (Smith et al., 2010; Markard and  
14   Rosenbloom, 2020b).

15   While both strategies are important, they are not sufficient. As we focus on  
16   developments for the better, we tend to miss those that do the opposite (Antal et  
17   al., 2020; Markard et al., 2021b). Below, we will argue that in order to adequately  
18   address grand sustainability challenges, transitions research should also *explore*  
19   *emerging ‘unsustainabilities.’* We coin the term *unsustainabilities* to capture the  
20   broad range of structures, practices and developments that make or keep societies  
21   less sustainable. In this way, unsustainabilities point to opposite directions as the  
22   ones favored by sustainability transitions. The concept of unsustainabilities  
23   parallels the ‘mobilities’ studies pioneered by John Urry and colleagues (Hannam  
24   et al., 2006), and embraces both long-term, global, dynamic processes of multi-  
25   dimensional socio-ecological change and the immediacy of everyday life.

26   Examples of unsustainabilities can be found everywhere: fast food, fast fashion,  
27   consumption-based lifestyles, high frequency product cycles, planned  
28   obsolescence, urban sprawl, mass tourism but also fracking, tar sands, deep sea  
29   mining, etc. To be sure, the point is not that there are unsustainable products or  
30   practices but that they *continue to expand and new ones keep emerging*, even in  
31   parallel with sustainability transitions. In fact, unsustainable developments  
32   counteract and potentially even dwarf the current efforts to innovate and transition  
33   toward sustainability.

34   Take electric vehicles. While they receive much attention in the transition toward  
35   low-carbon transport (Henderson, 2020; Kotilainen et al., 2019), automobility at  
36   large is shifting towards vehicles, which consume more materials in production,

37 more energy in use and are more dangerous than smaller cars (Taylor, 2020). Also,  
38 urban sprawl continues almost unabated, increasing the overall demand for  
39 transport. These transformations happen in plain sight but do not seem to get  
40 sufficient attention in transitions research. Ironically, the transition towards  
41 electric vehicles might even help to obscure the above developments for the worse.

42 The aim of this paper is to direct attention to unsustainabilities, to help chart the  
43 terrain and to show how transitions research can contribute. As a first step we  
44 reflect on gaps in existing research and present a typology of unsustainabilities.  
45 We also introduce three analytical dimensions, regime formation, needs and  
46 politics, we consider useful when studying unsustainable developments.

47 A second step is to detail what exploring unsustainability means for the agenda of  
48 transition studies; here we present two illustrative cases on SUVs and space  
49 tourism. The SUV case stands for a failed transition to cleaner transport with  
50 ineffective policies, a car centric culture, strong dependence on automobility and  
51 unsustainable user practices (Mattioli et al., 2020; Wells and Xenias, 2015). Space  
52 tourism, in contrast, is in the early stages of development (Spector et al., 2017). It  
53 might create new consumer aspirations and needs, similar to air travel from the  
54 1960s onwards. However, there is still an opportunity to intervene before major  
55 lock-ins have emerged. In both examples we focus on climate change as a central  
56 sustainability challenge, allowing that there are many more at play (e.g., air  
57 pollution, inequality, modern slavery). We conclude with implications for research  
58 and policy.

## 59 2 Theoretical background

60 We build on the sustainability transitions literature (Köhler et al., 2019) whose  
61 conceptualization and understanding of socio-technical change is also helpful to  
62 study the dynamics of unsustainabilities.

### 63 2.1 *Sustainability gaps in transitions research*

64 Transitions research is concerned with processes of fundamental change in socio-  
65 technical systems (Smith et al., 2010). Core frameworks such as the multi-level  
66 perspective or technological innovation systems were developed independent of  
67 sustainability considerations (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Geels, 2002; Rip  
68 and Kemp, 1998). Also, early empirical studies had no particular interest in  
69 sustainability (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1994; Geels, 2002; Geels, 2005).

70 Since around the 2000s, however, sustainability issues have become increasingly  
71 prominent in transitions research (Smith et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2010) and  
72 today, the intention to *foster sustainable system transformations* is a central driver

73 for the development of the field. The concept of transition management is  
74 inherently linked to sustainability issues (Loorbach, 2010; Rotmans et al., 2001)  
75 and *sustainability transitions* (Markard et al., 2012) has emerged as a focal term  
76 for transitions associated with environmental or social sustainability targets.


77 The scope of sustainability transitions research has widened over time. For many  
78 years, scholars have studied the interplay between, on the one hand, path-  
79 dependence and resistance at the level of established socio-technical systems (or  
80 regimes), and, on the other hand, radical innovations, which emerge in niches and  
81 challenge existing regimes (Kemp et al., 1998; Smith and Raven, 2012). In this line  
82 of research, the central sustainability strategy is to *foster innovations*, which have  
83 a potential to contribute to more sustainable modes of production and  
84 consumption.<sup>1</sup> Solar or wind energy are typical examples in this regard. Research  
85 has made much progress to better understand processes and actors that delay  
86 innovations, and how to overcome resistance (e.g. Bergek et al., 2008; Lauber and  
87 Jacobsson, 2016; Meckling et al., 2015). Policy suggestions have concentrated on  
88 how to support experimentation, innovation and diffusion (Hoogma et al., 2002;  
89 Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011; Sengers et al., 2019).

90 More recently, scholars have started to explore a second sustainability strategy:  
91 *accelerating the decline* of socio-technical system configurations or practices that  
92 cause particular sustainability problems (Markard et al., 2021a; Rinscheid et al.,  
93 2021; Turnheim and Geels, 2012). Examples are incandescent light bulbs, coal  
94 power plants or internal combustion engines (Meckling and Nahm, 2019;  
95 Rosenbloom, 2018; Stegmaier et al., 2014). Phase-out policies, technology bans or  
96 carbon pricing have been suggested to accelerate decline (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016;  
97 Rosenbloom et al., 2020; Rosenbloom and Rinscheid, 2020).

98 These two approaches (quadrants 1 and 3, Figure 1), are currently central  
99 strategies for research and policy advice in transition studies. While this was a  
100 useful start, it has created at least two blind spots. These include innovations that  
101 have been designed by other criteria than sustainability (quadrant 2) and the  
102 decline of practices and system configurations that are more sustainable than the  
103 ones that replace(d) them (quadrant 4). We will discuss these in detail below.

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<sup>1</sup> Note that innovations are not sustainable or unsustainable per se, which is why we use quotation marks. Instead, their effects depend on how they are used. See appendix.



104

105 **Figure 1: Established (dark grey) and neglected (ligh grey) strategies to**  
 106 **improve sustainability through socio-technical change**

107 *2.2 Mapping unsustainabilities*

108 There is large terrain of unsustainable developments, which remains to be charted  
 109 from a transitions perspective. Our typology of future research areas builds on  
 110 Figure 1 and adds a fifth category with meta rules that reach across multiple socio-  
 111 technical systems (Table 1). Our intention is to provide guidance and inspire  
 112 further research. The typology is not meant to be exhaustive and there will be  
 113 overlaps between the research areas.

114 There are three levels of aggregation. The innovation level is about emerging  
 115 novelties; it provides the opportunity to watch out for and guide sustainability in  
 116 early stages of development. The level of socio-technical systems is where larger  
 117 transformations unfold and lock-ins become particularly problematic.  
 118 Sustainability considerations have a wider impact here and missed opportunities  
 119 are much harder to correct. At the highest level of aggregation are meta rules or  
 120 infrastructures that impact multiple socio-technical systems (Schot and Kanger,  
 121 2018). At this level, unsustainabilities are particularly problematic because they  
 122 are pervasive and often persistent.

123 Next, we discuss critical issues, examples and topics for transition research for  
 124 each of the five areas. The first area is about innovations that are designed by other  
 125 considerations than sustainability (e.g., to reduce costs or create new markets).  
 126 While at best they don't create much harm, at worst they do. There are several,  
 127 partly interconnected issues that are relevant from a transition studies  
 128 perspective. First, if innovations diffuse widely, their impacts multiply. This can  
 129 lead to the formation of lock-ins or new socio-technical regimes. A related issue is

130 that innovations may result in the formation of new needs as in the case of SUVs.  
131 It will be very difficult to scale back these needs; the default is often to fulfill them  
132 with less harmful alternatives (e.g., electric SUVs). Third, if innovations spawn new  
133 markets, industries and entire socio-technical systems, as perhaps in the case of  
134 reusable rockets, this leads to the formation of business and political interests and  
135 resistance to change. Fourth, if they entrench existing (unsustainable) systems,  
136 they may effectively counteract ongoing sustainability transitions. This is the case  
137 for fracking or the exploitation of tar sands, which undermine the transition away  
138 from fossil fuels. Finally, the above effects are moderated by the longevity of  
139 artefacts, or infrastructures, related to the innovation.

140 The second area is about innovations to address sustainability challenges. While  
141 this is a classic topic in transition studies, it also comes with (often neglected)  
142 unsustainabilities. One of these is about ‘environmental problem shifting’ (van den  
143 Bergh et al., 2015), which occurs if one sustainability issue is addressed at the  
144 expense of another. For example, electric vehicles may help to address local air  
145 pollution and climate change but their batteries need minerals such as cobalt  
146 whose sourcing may be highly problematic (Sovacool et al., 2020). Problem shifting  
147 may also occur across places, e.g., if production is moved to regions with low  
148 environmental or social standards (Kabir et al., 2018). A second issue is about  
149 unwanted or unexpected effects. In the case of bioenergy, these include  
150 monocultures, competition with food production, or additional carbon emissions  
151 from soils (Markard et al., 2016). A third issue is about the implications of renewed  
152 lock-in once sustainable innovations have diffused widely.

153 Another area for further research is related to socio-technical systems with major  
154 sustainability issues. While already a key topic in transition studies, some  
155 unsustainabilities might deserve further attention. The first is about new and  
156 potentially problematic socio-technical systems emerging as in the case of space  
157 tourism. Second, transition research may want to widen the scope from the ‘usual  
158 suspect sectors’ such as energy or transport, to food and agriculture (Hebinck et  
159 al., 2021), tourism, plastics, fast fashion or other industries with extremely short  
160 product cycles. As we widen the sectoral scope, we will also be confronted with  
161 contexts and problem framings (e.g., circular economy) that challenge established  
162 transition frameworks. A third issue is about further entrenchment (e.g. through  
163 innovations such as fracking), increasing influence and power, or growing  
164 resistance to change (Unruh, 2000).

165  
166

168 **Table 1: Established and potential areas for research on unsustainabilities**

	<b>Critical issues</b>	<b>Topics for transition research</b>	<b>Examples</b>
<b>Innovations</b>			
1 Innovations designed by criteria other than sustainability (Q2)	Potentially wide diffusion and upscaling Formation of new needs Spawning of new markets and systems Entrenchment of existing systems and practices Longevity of artefacts	Processes of regime formation / entrenchment Needs and lifestyles; how to potentially scale them back Formation of political interests around new business opportunities	Numerous examples: SUVs; flying cars Space tourism Fracking; exploitation of tar sands Deep sea mining Widespread use of hot tubs
2 Innovations designed to address unsustainable socio-technical systems (Q1)	Problem shifting Unwanted effects, e.g. rebound effects, new socio-economic and geographic inequalities New lock-ins Delay and greenwashing	Widen the scope of transition studies: multiple sustainability goals, needs and demand side issues Incumbent actors and politics of delay	EV batteries (minerals, waste) Biofuels (land use, monocultures) Energy efficiency technologies
<b>Socio-technical systems</b>			
3 Socio-technical systems with major sustainability problems (Q3)	Emergence of new problematic systems / regimes Increasing entrenchment and resistance	Dynamics of regime formation and early destabilization Beyond the 'usual suspects'	Classic sectors (energy, transport, buildings, industry) Fast food / fast fashion Tourism Materials (e.g. plastics)
4 Socio-technical systems with favorable sustainability features (Q4)	Increasing pressure and destabilization Decline of sustainable technologies or practices	Rationales behind the decline of established practices	Nature based solutions Local production of goods Walking / active travel Passive heating / cooling
<b>Macro level structures</b>			
5 Meta rules and infrastructures	Diffusion of unsustainable meta rules and structures Decline of sustainable meta rules and structures	Changes in meta rules and how to conceptualized them	Cheap vs. durable, replace vs. repair, obsolescence, convenience, carbon intensive lifestyles, consumerism

170 The fourth area is related to socio-technical systems with specific technologies or  
171 practices that have favorable sustainability features. More research is warranted  
172 into how these systems come under pressure (e.g. for cost or convenience reasons)  
173 and potentially destabilize. Interesting cases include the decline of the American  
174 railroad system at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Roberts, 2017) or the decline  
175 of city tramways since around the 1950s and their eventual re-introduction  
176 (Turnheim and Geels, 2019). A related issue is the decline of specific practices  
177 such as those around heating or cooling (e.g., passive vs. air conditioning), drying  
178 or personal hygiene (Shove and Walker, 2010; Walker et al., 2014).

179 The fifth area includes infrastructures and meta rules. Meta rules include general  
180 principles, norms, values or practices that are widely shared across socio-technical  
181 systems (Kanger and Schot, 2019) but also across related fields such as finance,  
182 education, news reporting etc. Examples of problematic meta rules include  
183 business models based on fast product cycles, planned obsolescence, or mass  
184 production and consumption (Bocken and Short, 2021; De Graaf, 2002). From a  
185 transitions perspective, more research is warranted on why they are so persistent  
186 and how to change them.

187 At all levels, we distinguish developments associated with sustainability targets  
188 and those that are not. While the latter obviously deserve attention from a  
189 sustainability perspective, the former may be problematic as well.

### 190 *2.3 Regime formation, needs and politics: Three focal issues when studying* 191 *unsustainabilities*

192 Concepts and frameworks in the field of transition studies apply a *systemic view*  
193 on the dynamics of socio-technical change (Köhler et al., 2019). This means that  
194 actors, institutions, technologies and business and consumption practices change  
195 in a co-evolutionary way when innovations emerge and socio-technical systems  
196 transform (Geels, 2014a). Here, we briefly discuss three insights from transition  
197 studies we regard as relevant starting points when studying unsustainabilities.<sup>2</sup>  
198 While these three will guide our empirical analysis, they are not meant to be  
199 exhaustive.

200 The first issue is about lock-in and the formation of socio-technical regimes (Kemp  
201 et al., 1998; Unruh, 2000). Cumulative effects can lead to the formation of rigid  
202 structures, in which one socio-technical configuration becomes dominant and the  
203 actors, business models and user practices associated with this configuration  
204 become more influential than others. Once regimes have formed, they are very

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<sup>2</sup> Note that we do not engage with the issue of how to assess whether an innovation is sustainable or not. See Appendix for further explanation.

205 hard to change (Geels, 2014b; Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014). When studying  
206 unsustainable developments, it is key to understand how they affect (e.g.,  
207 strengthen) existing regimes or lead to the formation of new ones. Regime  
208 formation makes the impacts of unsustainabilities even worse.

209 A second issue is about (technology) users, needs and practices (Kemp and van  
210 Lente, 2011; Shove and Walker, 2010, van Lente, 2014). It is often assumed that  
211 needs exist prior to innovation and that the task of engineers and firms is to  
212 address these needs, e.g. through new technologies (van Lente, 2019). However,  
213 needs are not given, independent or stable. Instead, they emerge over time and co-  
214 evolve with technology (Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Shove, 2003; Shove and Walker,  
215 2010). They may also be deliberately created by businesses (Box 1). Another path  
216 for the formation of needs is when practices turn from luxuries (e.g., exotic  
217 vacations, flying and the 'jet-set') into commonplace activities (Lie and Sørensen,  
218 1996; Sørensen, 2006). The formation of needs is key for emerging  
219 unsustainabilities. Once new needs have emerged around an unsustainable  
220 practice, it may be very hard to change it.

Companies know that creating new needs is central to the success of new technologies, which is why budgets for R&D and marketing are often about the same. Business scholar Peter Drucker stated: "There is one valid definition of business purpose: to create a customer" (Drucker, 1954, 37). The history of technology provides many examples such as the success of the Kodak photo camera (Utterback, 1994). At the end of the 19th century, photography was a cumbersome activity for specialists. Eastman Kodak's idea was to make photography a low-threshold activity using celluloid instead of glass, which allowed rolling up light-sensitive layer. The roll was put in a closed box and users could send the entire device to the manufacturer, who would return the developed photos with a new, empty roll in the box. Eastman presented photography as a simple activity ("you push the button, we do the rest"), not only for the crucial moments of life but also for daily use. Indeed, photography became ubiquitous and today, it is an inseparable part of everyday life.

221 **Box 1: Early photography as an example of creating new needs**

222

223 A third issue is related to contestation and politics (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006;  
224 Roberts et al., 2018). New as well as established socio-technical configurations are  
225 supported by actors that benefit from it. As a result, transitions are characterized  
226 by struggles of competing groups of actors. These struggles can be observed in  
227 many instances, including the creation of markets, the formation of technology  
228 standards (Yap and Truffer, 2019) or the design of public policies (Hess, 2014;



229 Markard and Rosenbloom, 2020a). With regard to unsustainabilities, it will be key  
230 to analyze how public policies can be used to mitigate unwanted developments. It  
231 will also be key to understand how politics and political interests play into this,  
232 e.g. which groups of actors seek to push unsustainabilities despite their  
233 detrimental effects.

### 234 3 Case selection and analytical approach

235 With our empirical analysis we want to illustrate how unsustainabilities can  
236 undermine ongoing transitions and why they deserve attention from policymaking.  
237 Our focus is on innovations that were designed by criteria other than sustainability  
238 as outlined in section 2.2. We assume that innovations which are in an early stage  
239 of development show substantially different characteristics of unsustainabilities  
240 than those in a later stage; for instance, that they can be more easily guided by  
241 (precautionary) policies. In later stages, the sustainability implications are more  
242 clearly visible but it is more difficult to control or reverse these.<sup>3</sup>

243 We work with a qualitative case study approach (Yin, 2016) that includes two  
244 exemplary cases: SUVs and space tourism. We selected socio-technical  
245 innovations with repercussions for climate from different fields (mobility and  
246 tourism) to obtain a broader variety of insights. There is also a comparative element  
247 in our case selection (Bartlett and Vavrus, 2017), given that both innovations are  
248 in very different stages of development. SUVs grow out of a strong, well-established  
249 regime around automobility. They have already diffused widely and needs have  
250 formed. It is therefore very difficult for policy to change the course of the ongoing  
251 transition toward SUVs with pre-emptive or precautionary policies.<sup>4</sup> Alternatively,  
252 space tourism is an emerging innovation in a very early stage of development with  
253 competing ideas and designs and embryonic user needs. Arguably, there is still a  
254 window of opportunity for policy intervention and guidance toward more  
255 sustainable trajectories.

256 Our empirical analysis builds on the expertise of two co-authors with substantial  
257 knowledge and experience in the respective topics.<sup>5</sup> In addition, we compiled  
258 secondary data from a broad range of sources that have been published in recent  
259 years, primarily including news media, scientific publications and industry

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<sup>3</sup> This predicament is also known as the Collingridge dilemma (Collingridge, 1982; Genus and Stirling, 2018).

<sup>4</sup> In some places, SUVs have already formed a formidable regime, which means that the SUV case is touching upon research areas 1 and 3 (Table 1).

<sup>5</sup> These authors joined the team also because of this expertise, after the decision was taken to study SUVs and space tourism.

260 reports. From these sources, we also included quotes to illustrate some of the  
261 arguments.

262 Concept development and empirical analysis in this paper follow an abductive  
263 reasoning approach (Bell et al., 2018). Both our typology and our analytical  
264 dimensions were first derived deductively based on the transitions literature and  
265 subsequently refined inductively drawing on our emerging empirical insights. We  
266 also adapted the structure of our empirical analysis accordingly. This process was  
267 repeated until our final conceptualization matched our empirical findings, and vice  
268 versa.

269 Our analysis is structured along five key aspects, or dimensions (Table 2).  
270 Dimensions three to five are those introduced above, while one and two are more  
271 generic. The first captures the basic characteristics of the innovation, including its  
272 origins and current state of development, actual and potential applications, scope  
273 and level of disruption, important drivers and barriers, or how it is related to  
274 sectoral and spatial contexts. The second dimension covers actual and potential  
275 implications for sustainability. It also touches upon some of the critical issues  
276 mentioned above, e.g. risks due to widespread diffusion or the formation of new  
277 markets and industries.

278

279 **Table 2: Dimensions to analyze innovations designed by criteria other than sustainability**

	Key questions
<b>Basic characteristics and context</b>	What is the innovation about and what is its current state of development? How disruptive is the innovation? What are key drivers and barriers? How is it related to ongoing transitions and other context developments?
<b>Sustainability implications</b>	What are actual and potential implications for sustainability? Which of these will be inherent, which can be avoided and how? What are critical issues?
<b>Regimes and path-dependency</b>	Does the innovation relate to existing regimes? At what pace are new path-dependencies emerging and how persistent are they? What is the risk of path-dependencies?
<b>Needs and practices</b>	How does the innovation affect user practices? Are new needs emerging and how what are the risks (e.g. persistence)?
<b>Policy challenges and politics</b>	What are key policy challenges? What are the key actor groups involved and their interests?

280

## 281 4 Exploring SUVs and space tourism

### 282 4.1 SUVs

#### 283 4.1.1 Basic characteristics and context

284 Sports utility vehicles (SUVs) are an example of a product innovation in a mature  
285 industry. The SUV is an incremental development from off-road or pick-up style  
286 vehicles that previously formed a niche segment for special purposes. SUVs or  
287 'crossover' vehicles lack true off-road capability but have the styling cues, bulk  
288 and height of genuine off-road vehicles.

289 A definitive example of this new crossover SUV segment is the Nissan Qashqai.  
290 Introduced in 2006, this model was hugely successful, prompting other incumbent  
291 vehicle manufacturers to offer similar models. At the time

292 "…there were still considerable barriers to SUV ownership for many  
293 hatchback and saloon buyers… SUVs were considered too large for  
294 around-town maneuverability and general everyday usability, plus  
295 people didn't like the poor fuel efficiency and lackluster interior quality  
296 … We managed to persuade the business that we could break down some  
297 of these (consumer) barriers by taking the best bits of a family hatchback  
298 and adding the elements of SUVs that are most attractive to customers.  
299 And so, the idea of the first 'crossover' was born." (Peter Brown, Vehicle  
300 evaluation manager, Nissan, 2017)

301 SUVs can be sold at a premium to a large base of customers, marketed as rugged  
302 spacious, adventurous, versatile, and at the same time safer than smaller, sedan-  
303 type family cars. In the US market SUVs and crossover cars commanded  
304 transaction prices 39-51% higher than the equivalent saloon or hatchback, despite  
305 similar build costs (Snyder, 2017).

306 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2019a: 28):

307 "A key development of the past decade is the increasing share worldwide  
308 of the small SUV/pickup segment… [they] primarily replaced city cars,  
309 medium and large cars."

310 SUVs have diffused quickly, primarily replacing smaller cars. In Western Europe,  
311 the market share of SUVs grew from 8% in 2008, to around 35% by 2018, and  
312 45.5% by 2021.<sup>6</sup>

313 The transition to SUVs is happening at times in which the auto industry is  
314 confronted with a broad range of major structural challenges, some exacerbated  
315 by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. These include over-capacity, weak demand,

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<sup>6</sup> <https://www.best-selling-cars.com/europe/2021-full-year-europe-new-car-sales-and-market-analysis/>

316 technological changes such as digitalization and the increasing relevance of  
317 software, advances in autonomous driving, connectedness to mobile networks, and  
318 the beginning transition from internal combustion engines to battery electric  
319 vehicles (BEVs). The auto industry is confronted with regulatory constraints and  
320 increasing conflicts over scarce space in cities, air pollution and climate change  
321 (Bordovskikh, 2020).

322 Several of these developments are disruptive for incumbent firms, as they threaten  
323 their core business model, entail an entirely different view on the automobile  
324 (computer device vs. assemblage of hardware), or require new competences, e.g.,  
325 in software development, electric drive trains or battery system optimization.

326 For vehicle manufacturers, SUV vehicles are an ideal segment to develop and  
327 market many of these novel technologies. With BEVs, larger vehicles can hold  
328 larger battery packs, enabling performance and range expectations created by  
329 internal combustion engine vehicles to be met. According to the IEA, about half of  
330 all BEV models globally in 2021 were SUVs (IEA, 2022)

#### 331 4.1.2 Sustainability implications

332 SUVs come with an inherent increase in energy consumption as they substitute  
333 smaller cars. For example, the Nissan Qashqai 1.5 liter in 2006 had a weight of  
334 about 1,454kg and average emissions of 201.0 gCO<sub>2</sub>/km. This is 16% heavier and  
335 14% more polluting than the Nissan Almera, which it replaced.

336 Analysis from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2019b) suggests that SUVs  
337 were second only to the power sector in contributing to the increase in global CO<sub>2</sub>  
338 emissions since 2010. Carbon emissions from SUVs grew faster than the iron and  
339 steel, cement, aluminum, commercial vehicle and aviation industries. As a  
340 significant incremental change in the existing automobile regime, SUVs are almost  
341 'hiding in plain sight' from more high-profile instances of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions growth.

#### 342 4.1.3 Regimes and path-dependency

343 Automobility is an established socio-technical regime, centered around individual  
344 automobility and complemented by massive infrastructures, regulations, services,  
345 user practices and societal norms (Geels, 2018; Mattioli et al., 2020). Multiple  
346 incremental innovations in materials, components, and whole vehicles have acted  
347 to sustain the viability of the regime (Cohen, 2012; Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2012;  
348 Pel et al., 2020).

349 Within the established regime, the SUV is an innovation that builds on and  
350 strengthens existing regime structures. For example, SUVs fit readily into many  
351 existing regulations and road infrastructures, thereby benefiting from these  
352 complementarities. SUVs are easily accommodated within existing supply chains,  
353 manufacturing systems, distribution networks, retail structures, finance and

354 insurance provision, consumer expectations, and service and support systems.  
355 The SUV also continues the already entrenched path dependency around  
356 individual, long-range mobility as the dominant mode of transport in numerous  
357 countries and regions (Hoffmann et al., 2017).

358 At the same time, new regime structures have emerged that favor SUVs. One  
359 example are labels to inform consumers about fuel efficiency and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions  
360 of cars. Germany's mass-based weighing scheme has been designed to benefit  
361 heavy SUVs. As a result, a BMW X5 SUV which emits more than 150 gCO<sub>2</sub>/km  
362 receives an A label, while a VW Golf with 114 gCO<sub>2</sub>/km only gets a B (Haq and  
363 Weiss, 2016). The CO<sub>2</sub> emissions regulations flexibilities applied in the EU  
364 specifically use limit curves that allow manufacturers of heavier cars higher  
365 emissions than manufacturers of lighter cars.<sup>7</sup>

366 In 2020, Ford abandoned production of sedan (saloon) cars in North America to  
367 focus on SUVs and crossovers. All major auto makers include these vehicles in  
368 their model ranges. More tellingly, even niche sports and luxury auto makers such  
369 as Bentley (with the Bentayga), Lamborghini (Urus), Porsche (Cayenne), Maserati  
370 (Levante), Rolls Royce (Cullinan), and Aston Martin (DBX) now feel compelled to  
371 have models in this segment.

#### 372 4.1.4 Needs and practices

373 In deeply entrenched socio-technical systems such as automobility, needs are  
374 woven tightly into the fabric of everyday life and lifestyles, and are all the more  
375 difficult to alter (Hoffmann et al., 2017). In this sense the uptake of SUVs is latest  
376 manifestation of the generic condition of car dependence (Mattioli et al., 2020).  
377 Extant research suggests that to achieve deep de-carbonization goals in mobility  
378 will require a combination of electrification, policy measures and, crucially,  
379 lifestyle changes (Brand et al., 2019; Marsden et al., 2020). The latter includes  
380 issues such as where to live and work, whether and how to commute, whether and  
381 how often to drive children to destinations, or whether the car is viewed as a status  
382 symbol.

383 SUVs are linked to many of these issues. For example, the SUV concept is  
384 supportive of more active lifestyles and adventure holidays (Jensen and Guthrie,  
385 2006). Many activities such as windsurfing, off-road biking, mountain climbing,  
386 etc. have become more widely popular in recent years, and are often associated  
387 with large quantities of equipment and a desire to access more remote locations  
388 (Dunn, 2008).

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<sup>7</sup> see [https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/cars\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/cars_en)

389 As SUVs have become the new norm, consumers have come to ‘need’ SUVs, e.g.,  
390 for perceived safety benefits, no matter how erroneous that perception may be and  
391 despite the increased risk to other road users (Wells, 2006). As more people drive  
392 SUVs, it becomes less safe for others not to do so.

393 These old and new needs drive SUV usage, despite that SUVs may even be  
394 inconvenient, especially in cities with increasing congestion and greater concerns  
395 for the safety of other road users (Monfort and Mueller, 2020; Salisbury, 2020). It  
396 is possible that electrification of SUVs makes their use more socially acceptable.  
397 Policy challenges and politics

398 For decades, public policies have targeted transport in general and automobility in  
399 particular to reduce air pollution and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Along with more stringent  
400 emissions controls and a new regulatory regime for carbon emissions from vehicles  
401 in the EU, there had been a long-run decline in average new car CO<sub>2</sub> emissions  
402 from 159 gCO<sub>2</sub>/km (2007) to 118 gCO<sub>2</sub>/km (2016) (ICCT, 2020). However,  
403 improvements in efficiency are counteracted by an increase in traffic and the  
404 ongoing transition toward SUVs. In Germany, for example, emissions from road  
405 transport have not decreased since the 1990s (Gössling and Metzler, 2017).

406 Future policy targets seek to decrease overall emissions, notably many countries  
407 and the EU have adopted ‘end of sale’ dates for petrol and diesel cars or hybrids  
408 thereof. Typically, 2035 is posited as the end date for all such new car sales.

409 Alternatively, policies could target vehicle users and reduce the need for (and the  
410 generic dependence on) automobility, but are more difficult and complex to  
411 implement (Whittle et al., 2019). Policies to reverse the SUV trend would likely have  
412 to embrace the cultural framing of automobility through which needs emerge  
413 (Sovacool and Axsen, 2018).

414 With regard to future pathways, there are interesting overlaps between the  
415 transition toward SUVs and the transition toward BEVs. Many vehicle  
416 manufacturers - in the EU and elsewhere - seem determined to sell as many  
417 conventional SUVs as possible, up to the boundaries set by the various regulatory  
418 regimes for carbon emission reductions. At the same time, they also develop  
419 electric SUVs because the additional costs of electric battery packs and powertrain  
420 can be more readily recovered with premium segment vehicles. Finally, some  
421 automakers develop light-weight ‘L-category’ EVs such as the Renault Twizy or  
422 Citroen Ami, or the BMW i3 (Sovacool et al., 2019), in order to achieve an efficient  
423 vehicle with a smaller battery pack that is also more suited for short-distance  
424 traffic in congested cities<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> In China the ‘Low Speed Electric Vehicle’ is a distinct segment that claims around 20% of total EV sales, while in the US such a segment does not exist.

#### 425 4.1.5 Policy challenges and politics

426 For decades, public policies have targeted transport in general and automobility in  
427 particular in order to reduce air pollution and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Along with more  
428 stringent emissions controls and a new regulatory regime for carbon emissions  
429 from vehicles in the EU, there had been a long-run decline in average new car CO<sub>2</sub>  
430 emissions from 159 gCO<sub>2</sub>/km (2007) to 118 gCO<sub>2</sub>/km (2016) (ICCT, 2020).  
431 However, improvements in efficiency are counteracted by an increase in traffic and  
432 the ongoing transition toward SUVs. In Germany, for example, emissions from road  
433 transport have not decreased since the 1990s (Gössling and Metzler, 2017).

434 Future policy targets seek to decrease overall emissions.

435 “Cars and vans produce 15% of EU’s CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The Parliament  
436 approved new legislation to toughen car emissions standards,  
437 introducing CO<sub>2</sub> reduction targets of 37.5% for new cars and 31% for  
438 new vans by 2030. ... The Parliament is also calling for measures to  
439 facilitate the shift to electric and hybrid vehicles.” (European Parliament,  
440 2019)

441 Whether these targets will be reached is unclear. By and large, past policies have  
442 not yet disrupted the dominant pathway towards more cars and larger vehicles.  
443 Vehicle manufacturers have lobbied against strong emission regulations for  
444 decades, mostly with success.<sup>9</sup> They favor technological solutions for carbon  
445 targets, even though these might not be sufficient without additional behavioral  
446 change (Whittle et al., 2019).

447 Alternatively, policies could target vehicle users and reduce the need for (and the  
448 generic dependence on) automobility, but are more difficult and complex to  
449 implement (Whittle et al., 2019). Policies to reverse the SUV trend would likely have  
450 to embrace the cultural framing of automobility through which needs emerge  
451 (Sovacool and Axsen, 2018).

452 With regard to future pathways, there are interesting overlaps between the  
453 transition toward SUVs and the transition toward EVs. Many vehicle  
454 manufacturers - in the EU and elsewhere - seem determined to sell as many  
455 conventional SUVs as possible, up to the boundaries set by the various regulatory  
456 regimes for carbon emission reductions. At the same time, they also develop  
457 electric SUVs because the additional costs of electric battery packs and powertrain  
458 can be more readily recovered with premium segment vehicles. Finally, some

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<sup>9</sup> During the period 2020 to 2022 vehicle manufacturers selling in the EU can gain ‘super credits’ towards their 120 gCO<sub>2</sub>/km regulated fleet average target for new vehicles, on the basis that every electric vehicle sold (zero gCO<sub>2</sub>/km) will count double in 2020, 1.67 times in 2021, and 1.33 times in 2022. In this sense, Nissan can sell more Qashqai models on the basis of having sold more Leaf (BEV) models.

459 automakers develop light-weight ‘L-category’ EVs such as the Renault Twizy or  
460 Citroen Ami, or the BMW i3 (Sovacool et al., 2019), in order to achieve an efficient  
461 vehicle with a smaller battery pack that is also more suited for short-distance  
462 traffic in congested cities<sup>10</sup>.

## 463 4.2 *Space tourism*

### 464 4.2.1 Basic characteristics and context

465 Space tourism is a service innovation in the rapidly growing space flight industry  
466 (Spector et al., 2017). The core idea is to send non-astronaut citizens to outer space  
467 for recreational purposes. Commercial space tourism is currently planned at the  
468 orbital or suborbital levels, although some firms even speak about lunar tours.  
469 Both, the idea and the underlying technologies are radically new. The business  
470 rationale is to create attention and to use the profits for further technology  
471 development. Space tourism is still in an early stage of development (with ultra-  
472 rich individuals as pioneering customers) but progressing rapidly.

473 The history of space tourism can be dated back to the late 1990s, when the  
474 American businessman Dennis Tito became the world’s first space tourist visiting  
475 the International Space Station (ISS) with the Russian spacecraft Soyuz TM-32.<sup>11</sup>  
476 The service was offered as a means to generate income for the maintenance of the  
477 aging Russian space station. Later, a Virginia-based firm, in collaboration with the  
478 Russian space agency, sent eight tourists to the ISS on flights lasting ten or more  
479 days.<sup>12</sup> Tickets were sold at 20 Mio USD in 2001 and 35 Mio USD in 2009.<sup>13</sup>

480 The recent developments around space tourism are driven by the rapid growth of  
481 the so-called ‘New Space’ movement (Clormann, 2021; Robinson and Mazzucato,  
482 2019). While in the past space activities primarily took the form of missions led by  
483 national governments, activities today are increasingly led by private firms  
484 complemented with support from public space agencies. Progress in space tourism  
485 has in particular benefit from the technology advance in reusable rockets and the  
486 commercialization of space travel.<sup>14</sup> Space companies such as Virgin Galactic (with

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<sup>10</sup> In China the ‘Low Speed Electric Vehicle’ is a distinct segment that claims around 20% of total EV sales, while in the US such a segment does not exist.

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/space-tourism> accessed April 20, 2020

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/how-much-does-space-travel-cost-ncna919011>  
accessed April 20, 2020

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/how-much-does-space-travel-cost-ncna919011>  
accessed April 20, 2020

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.airbus.com/public-affairs/brussels/our-topics/space/new-space.html> accessed  
November 18, 2020



487 Boeing as minority shareholder), Blue Origin, and SpaceX present highly  
488 ambitious visions, racing to be the first to offer commercial space tourism services.  
489 Billionaire entrepreneurs such as Richard Branson and Elon Musk back these  
490 ventures financially and herald recreational space travel as an individual human  
491 right for ultimate freedom.

492 Space tourism is embedded in the context of the larger space sector, which also  
493 includes the launch of satellites and the transport of astronauts or goods, e.g. to  
494 the ISS. To improve the reliability and costs of their technologies, many space  
495 companies exploit the synergies between these different markets.

#### 496 4.2.2 Sustainability implications

497 Although space tourism may be a cornerstone of large-scale space exploration in  
498 the future, scaling up leisure space travel is likely to have major consequences for  
499 the Earth's climate (Spector et al., 2020). Space tourism is inherently energy  
500 intense and there are three main types of problematic emissions: Chemicals  
501 (chlorine) which lead to ozone depletion, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and soot emissions. The  
502 latter two can severely contribute to climate change.

503 In terms of carbon footprint, each rocket launch would result in about 150 metric  
504 tons of carbon<sup>15</sup>. This makes every rocket launch equivalent to about 3 times as  
505 much CO<sub>2</sub> as a transatlantic flight (with about 50-100 times more passengers).  
506 Following the goal of companies like SpaceX to launch once every two weeks, this  
507 would accumulate to approximately 4,000 tons of carbon annually, just for one  
508 firm.

509 In terms of soot (also known as black carbon), latest simulations show that  
510 emissions could significantly raise temperatures in the polar regions. Soot  
511 deposited on the surface absorbs more sunlight energy than snow or ice. Soot may  
512 also remain in the stratosphere for up to ten years, where it absorbs sunlight and  
513 exacerbates global warming (Chapman, 2015).

514 The sustainability impacts of space tourism may multiply in the near future.  
515 Business plans for space tourism estimate a flight rate of 1,000 suborbital trips  
516 per year once the space companies routinely fly passengers for leisure purposes.  
517 The excerpt below shows the ambitious plans of companies to scale up the  
518 business in the future:

519        “In time, we expect to be operating a variety of vehicles from multiple  
520        locations to cater for the demands of the growing space-user community.  
521        Whether that be transporting passengers to Earth orbiting hotels and

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<sup>15</sup> <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/spacex-environmentally-responsible-180968098/> accessed April 22, 2020

522 science laboratories, or providing a world-shrinking, transcontinental  
523 service [...].” Virgin Galactic<sup>16</sup>

524

525 There is an increasing number of voices in the field that call for more attention to  
526 the sustainability implications of commercializing space tourism:

527 “Due to particularly harmful ‘black carbon’ being emitted at very high  
528 altitudes, 1000 spaceflight launches per year would constitute an  
529 analogous contribution to climate change as currently exerted by the  
530 entire aviation industry.” (Spector et al., 2017, p. 280).

531 “If we understand rocket emission now, while their impacts are still  
532 smaller than aviation’s impacts, then proper guidelines and metrics  
533 could be established that encourage space industry growth...If we wait  
534 until rocket impacts are large, then such actions might be a burden.”  
535 Martin Ross, The Aerospace Corporation.<sup>17</sup>

536 “As long as the space tourism industry is developed without the  
537 necessary cautions, it remains at risk of becoming the most anti-  
538 sustainable tourism sector, with pervasive negative impacts at the global  
539 scale.” Asli Tasci, Professor of tourism.<sup>18</sup>

540

#### 541 4.2.3 Regimes and path-dependency

542 Space tourism can be understood as an ‘emergent’ socio-technical regime, without  
543 specific regime structures or configurations. The industry is still in an early stage  
544 of development with no dominant technological designs nor business models.  
545 However, technological competition and business narratives in public media  
546 develop rapidly, leading to progressive formation of visions and ideals, attracting  
547 financial investments and customers, as well as gaining government support.

548 Configurations for space tourism potentially rest in two forms. On one hand, Blue  
549 Origin and Virgin Galactic are both experimenting their technologies, i.e. the New  
550 Shepard rocket system the SpaceShipTwo respectively, for short suborbital  
551 tourism. On the other hand, SpaceX aims to send tourists on a trip to the ISS, and  
552 even around the moon. SpaceX focuses on developing its Dragon spacecraft and  
553 the Falcon Heavy (or Falcon 9) rocket. Partnering with Axiom and NASA, SpaceX  
554 successfully sent a crew of private actors to the ISS in April 2022 – marking a new

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<sup>16</sup> <https://www.virgingalactic.com/vision/> accessed January 12, 2020

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.digitaltrends.com/dtdesign/environmental-costs-of-space-tourism/> accessed April 22, 2020

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.ucf.edu/pegasus/space-tourism/> accessed April 22, 2020

555 major milestone for commercial spaceflight.<sup>19</sup> Progress in the nascent space  
556 tourism industry is largely attributed to rapid cost reduction. Compared to the  
557 early NASA Space Shuttle program in 1981 during which the payload cost was  
558 more than 50,000 USD/kg, SpaceX claimed a payload cost of less than 3,000  
559 USD/kg in 2018 (Jones, 2018).<sup>20</sup>

560 If the emergent regime of space tourism matures in the future, it might be too  
561 difficult to destabilize it, given the strong path-dependency it potentially anchors  
562 into the sector. As mentioned, private spaceflight and transportation play an  
563 increasingly prominent role in fueling the majority of space activities today (e.g.,  
564 satellite launch, transporting goods and astronauts, or even public-private  
565 missions on the Moon). In particular, space-based infrastructures -- rely heavily  
566 on lower launching costs -- are rapidly developed and promoted for sustainability  
567 purposes (Yap and Truffer, 2022) and have attracted enormous business and  
568 policy investments (McKinsey, 2022). Disrupting a successful regime formation of  
569 space tourism in the future, therefore, is not just about limiting private leisure in  
570 space but could mean disrupting multi-dimensional path-dependencies of almost  
571 the entire space sector. The regime formation of space tourism, in parallel of other  
572 space developments, may therefore be seen as shaping emerging meta rules of the  
573 space sector, political struggles and impacts of which might be huge and  
574 irreversible.

#### 575 4.2.4 Needs and practices

576 As of today, space tourism still targets rich and ultra-rich individuals. For a flight  
577 to the ISS, a few people paid between 20 and 35 Mio USD in the past (see above).  
578 Tickets for several hours in zero gravity are expected to be much cheaper.  
579 According to Virgin Galactic, about 650 tickets (250'000 USD each)<sup>21</sup> were already  
580 sold before the orbital flight by Richard Branson himself in July 2021. Since then,  
581 prices for a ticket grew up to \$450,000 with a waiting list of about 800 customers.<sup>22</sup>  
582 This shows a growing demand for space tourism and that certain people are ready  
583 to pre-pay tickets, thereby financing missions, the concept of which still needs to  
584 be proven.

585 Although it is early to say that space tourism will form a new need, the progress  
586 made may rapidly turn the vision of a few into a reality for many. The promotion

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<sup>19</sup> <https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/04/07/the-international-space-station-will-welcome-its-first-all-private-crew-of-astronauts-this> accessed July 8, 2022

<sup>20</sup> [https://www.nasa.gov/mission\\_pages/shuttle/flyout/index.html](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/flyout/index.html), accessed June 20, 2020

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/how-much-does-space-travel-cost-ncna919011>, accessed April 20, 2020

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.space.com/virgin-galactic-spaceship-factory-arizona> accessed July 22, 2022

587 of space tourism – built upon future imaginaries and hope - has intensified over  
588 time while visions seem to converge around a common set of ideals or ideographs.  
589 Firms appeal to shared values such as sustainability, rights for freedom, a better  
590 future, or democracy, to legitimize space tourism (Spector et al., 2020).

591 An excerpt below shows an example of a marketing narrative framed around  
592 sustainability concerns for Earth:

593 “As space adventure will boost the economy, it likewise will increase our  
594 appreciation of how rare and valuable our own planet is. The experience  
595 of traveling out of Earth’s atmosphere and looking back on the world we  
596 inhabit produces a sense of awe and respect...” Allan Fyall, Professor of  
597 tourism marketing<sup>23</sup>

598 In other instances, narratives framed around benefits for future generations could  
599 be found, presenting space tourism as almost necessary:

600 “Blue Origin believes that in order to preserve Earth, our home, for our  
601 grandchildren’s grandchildren, we must go to space to tap its unlimited  
602 resources and energy [...] our road to space opens to the door to the  
603 infinite and yet unimaginable future generations might enjoy. Paving the  
604 way starts now.” Blue Origin<sup>24</sup>

605 If the promises and visions materialize and cost reduces significantly in the future,  
606 the demand for leisure space travel is likely to become increasingly common among  
607 the wealthy. Those who aspire a trip to space might associate space tourism with  
608 human rights and personal freedom, or flaunt their higher social status through  
609 extravagant leisure activities. This might eventually lead to new kinds of lock-ins  
610 around emerging needs such as the ‘necessity’ of new adventure, new perspectives,  
611 and lifetime experience even at the expense of environmental sustainability.

#### 612 4.2.5 Policy challenges and politics

613 Policy challenges related to space tourism are contextualized within the broader,  
614 changing space sector. These include environmental issues such as the carbon  
615 emissions of rockets, the accumulation of space debris, as well as questions  
616 around access, ownership, and control of space technologies. Resolving these  
617 policy and regulatory issues is challenging and requires a high level of  
618 international coordination. International organizations that have started to  
619 address space governance issues include such as the European Space Agency  
620 (ESA), United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) have been active in  
621 advocating for new institutions.

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<sup>23</sup> <https://www.ucf.edu/pegasus/space-tourism/> accessed January 12, 2020

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.blueorigin.com/our-mission> accessed January 12, 2020

622 With regard to space tourism, policies and regulations are needed to address the  
623 increasing repercussions for climate change and broader sustainability issues.<sup>25</sup>  
624 At the moment, many aspects of private space travel are not yet regulated and  
625 national and international policies on space tourism are either non-existent or at  
626 a very early stage of development. Governments have not devoted much attention  
627 to regulating emissions of rocket launches. Since rocket launches in the past were  
628 considered a matter of national security, they have been largely exempted from  
629 environmental legislation. However, this perspective has changed since scientists  
630 began to question the environmental consequences:

631 “Until legislation is put in place, the inequality of environmental harm  
632 caused by space tourism will continue...Most of us are here on the  
633 surface dealing with the full brunt of the climate crisis...while just a tiny  
634 number of people are up there having these opportunities.” Mahir Ilgas,  
635 environmental action group 350.<sup>26,27</sup>

636 Overseeing private spaceflight activities or constraining touristic space travels  
637 seems to be challenging (Spector et al., 2020). The industry is gaining increasing  
638 political influence, not just because of its enormous economic potential but also  
639 because space tourism targets influential customers. If successfully  
640 commercialized and scaled up with current technologies and fuel systems, space  
641 tourism is inherently unsustainable if and when space travel becomes an  
642 established practice.

### 643 4.3 Summary

644 Here we review both cases and summarizes the main findings (Table 3). The SUV  
645 is an incremental innovation in an established industry. Its diffusion is in full  
646 swing and it exacerbates long-standing issues around energy use and CO<sub>2</sub>  
647 emissions. Space tourism, in contrast is a radical innovation in an emerging  
648 industry in an early stage of development. It might cause major energy and climate  
649 problems (Spector et al., 2020).  
650

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<sup>25</sup> <https://phys.org/news/2022-06-climate-space-tourism-urgent-mitigation.html> accessed July 8, 2022

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.digitaltrends.com/dtdesign/environmental-costs-of-space-tourism/> Accessed April 20, 2020

<sup>27</sup> <https://350.org/about/> Accessed April 22, 2020

651

652 **Table 3: Analytical dimensions and main differences across the two cases**

	SUVs	Space tourism
<b>Basic characteristics and context</b>	Incremental innovation in automobile industry; Late stage, transition in full swing; Driven by profitability and complementarities	Radical innovation in the rapidly developing space flight industry; Early stage; Driven by new technologies and the commercialization of space travel
<b>Sustainability implications</b> (energy and climate)	Inherent increase in energy consumption, conventional engines: above average CO <sub>2</sub> emissions	Inherent, massive energy consumption, CO <sub>2</sub> and soot emissions in stratosphere
<b>Regimes and path-dependency</b>	Strengthens industry incumbents and established business models; increases path-dependency; Carry-over impacts on markets for electric cars	No regime structure or path-dependencies yet; but strong visions for future industry and resourceful players to push the development
<b>Needs and practices</b>	Reproduces existing practices around individual automobility; Creates new needs around status, and safety	Luxury for the ultra-rich; emerging demand but no established needs or practices yet
<b>Policy challenges and politics</b>	Policy failure after decades of emission and climate regulations; in conflict with low-carbon transport pathways	Under-regulated sector; window of opportunity to shape future pathways; international coordination as a challenge

653 The SUV case shows how innovations can entrench existing regime structures,  
654 including established business models and incumbent actors. SUV design and  
655 concepts are now also carried over to the transition toward electric vehicles. Space  
656 tourism, in contrast, is a case, where system formation is still in flux with many  
657 uncertainties in terms of future pathways. Nonetheless, resourceful actors push  
658 strong visions around a large and vibrant industry with little to no concerns  
659 around sustainability issues.

660 For space tourism, needs have not yet emerged, so there is still room to shape and  
661 moderate the expectations of future customers. If policies for sustainable space  
662 tourism were developed soon, we would expect little to no resistance from potential  
663 users. This is very different for SUVs: they have already become the norm for many  
664 users (e.g., for driving your kids to school) and new needs (e.g., around status and  
665 safety) have emerged around it. In fact, SUVs fit well into the existing ‘car-  
666 dependent transport system’, where infrastructures, lifestyles, urban sprawl and  
667 a car-centered culture have co-developed and reinforced each other (Mattioli et al.,  
668 2020).

669 With regard to policy and politics, the SUV case is a very interesting example  
670 because the automotive sector was not somehow overlooked by policy. On the  
671 contrary, the sector's sustainability issues have been under scrutiny by scientists,  
672 environmental NGOs and policymakers for many years (Geels et al., 2012). That  
673 the SUV transition unfolded nonetheless can be viewed as a blatant failure of at  
674 least two decades of emission and climate policy in transport. It is also an  
675 important reminder of how rigid and resistant to change socio-technical regimes  
676 can become, e.g., with their key actors having close ties into policymaking to  
677 prevent effective climate policies (Skeete, 2017; Wells et al., 2013).

678 In contrast, space tourism has received very little attention in terms of climate or  
679 environmental policy up to now even though sustainability repercussions might be  
680 substantial. While there is still room to guide the emerging developments into a  
681 more sustainable direction, or to constrain them (Matignon, 2019), more and more  
682 firms and nations are focusing on the new opportunities and there is an ongoing  
683 race towards commercialization that might leave environmental sustainability  
684 considerations behind. Another major policy challenge is international policy  
685 coordination, as firms can evade to those places where regulations are less strict  
686 (Yuan, 2021).

## 687 5 Discussion and conclusions

688 In this paper we outlined a new area for transitions studies: unsustainabilities. We  
689 began charting the territory, developed a typology and explored two exemplary  
690 cases, which show that innovations may not only negatively affect ongoing  
691 sustainability transitions but also cause new sustainability problems. Below, we  
692 discuss implications for transitions research and policymaking.

### 693 5.1 *Implications for research*

694 Even though we are only beginning to explore unsustainabilities from a transition  
695 studies perspective, we can already identify promising issues for research.

696 The first is about *widening the scope of research* in the field of sustainability  
697 transitions. This includes the innovations and sectors we study: here, we want to  
698 go beyond the 'usual suspects' to explore topics that have been overlooked so far  
699 but are still highly relevant from a sustainability perspective (Antal et al., 2020;  
700 Kanger, 2020). However, a wider scope also includes studying sustainability  
701 tradeoffs across sectors and places (van den Bergh et al., 2015) and across other  
702 sustainability dimensions as in the case of minerals used for batteries or the

703 justice dimension of the energy transition (Johnstone and Hielscher, 2017;  
704 Sovacool et al., 2016).<sup>28</sup>

705 A second topic centers around the *interaction of multiple transitions*. There are at  
706 least two issues here, the increasing complexity and cumulative effects. With  
707 regard to the former, we have to adapt existing or develop new frameworks to  
708 capture the interplay of multiple transitions and the key processes involved  
709 (Andersen and Markard, 2020; Rosenbloom, 2020). The deep transitions approach  
710 can certainly offer some insights here even though it was developed to study very  
711 long-term patterns of change, in particular on the generation of new,  
712 unsustainable meta rules and the consequential influences on meta regimes  
713 (Kanger and Schot, 2019). With regard to the latter, we need to better understand  
714 the conditions for multiple transitions to generate cumulative effects in terms of  
715 sustainability, instead of conflicts and trade-offs. This will be a central topic for  
716 the net-zero energy transition, where we expect transitions in electricity, buildings,  
717 transport and industry to support and reinforce each other (IEA, 2021).

718 A third research topic is about the dynamics of *regime formation*. This includes the  
719 emergence of dominant socio-technical configurations or standards (Heiberg et al.,  
720 2022; Markard and Erlinghagen, 2017), the formation of markets (Dewald and  
721 Truffer, 2012), guidance of innovation processes (Yap and Truffer, 2019), emerging  
722 coalitions of actors (Hess, 2019) or changes in user practices and the formation of  
723 needs (Shove and Walker, 2007; Shove and Walker, 2010). While many of these  
724 aspects have already been addressed in transition studies with the interest to  
725 support more sustainable alternatives and to destabilize established regimes, the  
726 new research agenda will also have to address how to prevent potential lock-ins or  
727 slow-down the formation of new regimes.

728 A fourth promising topic for future research relates to the *meta rules* that guide  
729 most innovation activities and also the workings of socio-technical systems more  
730 broadly (Kanger and Schot, 2019). With a specific focus on unsustainabilities, we  
731 want to understand, question and ideally transform key principles of our  
732 economies that are associated with mass consumption, continuous growth, profit  
733 orientation, or waste production (Feola, 2020; Kemp et al., 2018). A better  
734 understanding of how to foster new and more sustainable meta rules or even the  
735 emergence of new meta regimes may help identify opportunities and challenges to  
736 building post-growth or degrowth economies (Cosme et al., 2017).

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<sup>28</sup> See also research area 2 in Table 1 in this regard.



## 737 5.2 Policy implications

738 To address transitions toward sustainability in an encompassing way,  
739 policymaking needs to address all different kinds of unsustainabilities (Table 1)  
740 and even navigate across them. This policy agenda goes beyond sustainability  
741 issues of established socio-technical systems, which have been traditionally on the  
742 political radar, and also beyond potentially problematic innovations, which were  
743 in the focus of this paper.

744 With regard to innovations such as SUVs and space tourism, we suggest  
745 developing *precautionary innovation policies*, which can identify and tackle  
746 sustainability issues in an early stage of development before novelties have  
747 diffused widely, regimes have formed and wants have sedimented into needs. Such  
748 policies have to assess innovations as to whether they potentially jeopardize  
749 established policy targets such as those formulated in the European Green Deal  
750 (European Commission, 2019). When developing precautionary policies, we might  
751 want to engage with the literatures on innovation and transition policy (Haddad et  
752 al., 2022; Kivimaa and Kern, 2016) but also with environmental governance which  
753 has adopted a more anticipatory perspective towards unsustainable developments  
754 (Muiderman et al., 2020; Muiderman et al., 2022).

755 Precautionary innovation policies complement but also differ from established  
756 innovation and transition policy approaches. They contrast with innovation  
757 policies from the past, which were primarily serving an economic growth narrative  
758 associated with the principle of ‘the more innovation, the better.’ Instead, they  
759 complement mission-oriented innovation policies that target specific kinds of  
760 innovations to address grand societal challenges such as climate change or  
761 inequality (Mazzucato, 2018). At the same time, precautionary policies go beyond  
762 mission-oriented policies because they seek to guide and restrain innovations that  
763 might undermine the mission targets. Precautionary policies also complement  
764 contemporary sustainability transition policies (Rosenbloom et al., 2020), which  
765 largely follow a ‘firefighting’ approach as they seek to ameliorate sustainability  
766 issues of established socio-technical systems instead of seeking to prevent such  
767 systems to emerge in the first place.

768 Policies to guide sustainability transitions are already complex. They have to  
769 address innovation and decline processes, accommodate for different transition  
770 phases and the particularities of different sectors, and carefully manage the  
771 associated politics (Kern et al., 2019; Kivimaa and Kern, 2016; Rosenbloom et al.,  
772 2020). Adding precautionary policies increases the complexity even more and  
773 makes the design of transition policy mixes a daunting task (Lindberg et al., 2019;  
774 Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). A particular challenge is that these new policies come  
775 on top of already existing policy structures (Flanagan et al., 2011; Flanagan and  
776 Uyarra, 2016).

777 Finally, policymaking aiming to prevent or address unsustainabilities should also  
778 deal more explicitly with cross-departmental policy coordination (Markard et al.,  
779 2020; Peters, 2018), long-term policy orientation (Guston, 2014), or strengthening  
780 trustworthy institutions at the science-policy interface (Lacey et al., 2018). This  
781 overall allows better management of tradeoffs and more comprehensive  
782 policymaking to guide societal transition and transformation toward sustainable  
783 futures.

### 784 *5.3 Conclusion and outlook*

785 With this paper, we have explored a new area for sustainability transition studies.  
786 First and foremost, it is an appeal to not only focus on the positive but to also  
787 watch out for adversary developments. Given the extent and urgency of many  
788 sustainability challenges, we need to work on all fronts to counter not only  
789 established but also emerging practices that are unsustainable. It is a call for  
790 policy and research. The policy challenge will be to develop precautionary  
791 transition policies and strategies to identify, assess, guide and potentially  
792 constrain developments that exacerbate grand sustainability challenges instead of  
793 mitigating them. The research challenge will be to develop concepts and  
794 frameworks that cover the underlying complexities (e.g. multiple transitions,  
795 unsustainable meta rules). Topics around unsustainabilities open a new strand of  
796 important research in the field of transition studies. It is high time to address the  
797 associated challenges.

798

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## 1133 Appendix

### 1134 *Challenges when dealing with (un)sustainability*

1135 There are several challenges when it comes to assessing whether an innovation is  
1136 sustainable or not. These include uncertainty, values, multi-dimensionality, scope  
1137 and use issues (Ely et al., 2014; Pope et al., 2004). We briefly discuss these below  
1138 to flag that there are longstanding debates around these issues. At the same time,  
1139 it is not within the scope of this article to address them in greater detail.

1140 First, innovations are inherently uncertain. In early stages of innovation, we just  
1141 know very little about the potential benefits and shortcomings of an innovation  
1142 (Collingridge, 1982; Genus and Stirling, 2018). For example, who would have  
1143 thought that the innovation of computer-to-computer communication at DARPA  
1144 would result in one of the most central technologies of our time, including  
1145 Facebook and millions of people uploading pictures of their cats or dinner? There  
1146 might also be unwanted effects such as the competition of biomass use for energy  
1147 with food production or conservation of forests.

1148 Second, sustainability issues are a matter of values and preferences. Different  
1149 societal groups or constituencies carry different values when it comes to e.g.,  
1150 climate change, clean water, air pollution, security etc. Also, these values are  
1151 socially constructed and might change over time. One way to address this dilemma  
1152 in technology assessment studies is to make the influence of values on outcomes  
1153 transparent and to leave the decision to political decision makers, instead of  
1154 technology experts (Ely et al., 2014).

1155 A related issue is multi-dimensionality. In sustainability (transitions) research, we  
1156 often tend to focus on one sustainability dimension such as climate change.  
1157 However, there are many other dimensions such as those listed in the  
1158 17 sustainable development goals (Sachs et al., 2019). Often, there are trade-offs  
1159 between different sustainability goals (Kemp and van Lente, 2011). For example,  
1160 both wind and nuclear power are low-carbon technologies. While wind has negative  
1161 impacts on nature and landscapes, nuclear power plants produce highly  
1162 problematic waste, bear the risk of dramatic accidents and can be used to arm  
1163 atomic weapons.

1164 A fourth issue is the scope of analysis. Whenever we draw boundaries, e.g., around  
1165 a sector or country, there is a risk of ‘environmental problem shifting’ (van den  
1166 Bergh et al., 2015). A selected sustainability problem is solved within these  
1167 boundaries (e.g., Western countries) while other places are confronted with  
1168 additional problems. Take electric vehicles, which reduce air pollution and GHG  
1169 emissions but require problematic resources for their batteries such as cobalt,  
1170 which – partly – is produced by artisanal mining and child labor in the Democratic  
1171 Republic of Congo (Sovacool, 2019). Similar issues apply to sectoral boundaries.

1172 The temporal scope is closely related to this. For example, an innovation can be  
1173 more sustainable in the short run but generate bigger problems later on. Re-usable  
1174 rockets are clearly an innovation that generates sustainability improvements (less  
1175 waste and pollution) in today’s space industry. In the future, however, they may  
1176 turn into a problematic technology, when they enable dramatic cost reductions  
1177 and become the steppingstone for space tourism (see below). In the long run  
1178 though, we can also envision a future, in which space tourism is again the  
1179 steppingstone for reaching out beyond Earth, the sustainability implications of  
1180 which we can hardly grasp.

1181 Finally, there are many different ways of how technologies can be used. Developing  
1182 reusable rockets for scientific missions can be viewed as sustainable, using them  
1183 for touristic purposes is less sustainable. Pattern recognition can be used to  
1184 identify faulty products in a production system, or to track political activists in a  
1185 totalitarian state. The use issue is related to the temporal scope and to uncertainty.

1186 We extract three major lessons from this. First, whether an innovation should  
1187 receive policy support (or should rather be abandoned) for sustainability reasons

1188 is a political decision by a specific constituency in a specific context at a specific  
1189 time. Second, unfolding transition pathways are laden with uncertainties and  
1190 unwanted effects. Third, all innovations come with a variety of sustainability effects  
1191 on a variety of dimensions.

1192 When we suggest focusing on unsustainabilities, we want to direct attention to the  
1193 risk that policy making might overlook systemic sustainability problems in early  
1194 stages of development, thereby missing the window of opportunity for intervention  
1195 and re-orientation.

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